mercoledì 29 dicembre 2010

148 states call for transparency over depleted uranium use in UN vote

148 states call for transparency over depleted uranium use in UN vote

148 states have supported a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on state users of depleted uranium weapons to reveal where the weapons have been fired when asked to do so by affected countries.
8 December 2010 - ICBUW

The resolution was passed by a huge majority, with just four countries opposing the text. As with previous UN resolutions in 2007 and 2008, the UK, US, Israel and France voted against. The number of abstentions was down on previous years after Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece, Luxembourg and Slovenia voted in favour. Nevertheless, abstentions were still registered by Australia, Canada, Denmark and Sweden amongst others. The Russian Federation also abstained, while China declined to vote.

UN logo The resolution was triggered by growing concern over the US’s failure to release information on the whereabouts of at least 400,000kgs depleted uranium munitions used in Iraq. Question marks also remain over whether the weapons have been used in Afghanistan, Somalia and Chechnya. Research by ICBUW has shown that the rapid release of targeting data after conflicts is crucial in reducing avoidable civilian exposures; recommendations that national authorities monitor soil and water contamination and, where necessary, decontaminate sites, are also reliant on this data.

The UK, US and France maintain that it is up to the users of the weapons to release this data at a time and in a manner of their own choosing. While the UK has shared information on their use of the weapons in Iraq in 2003 with UN agencies, the US has made no effort to do so. It is now 19 years since the first major use of depleted uranium in Iraq.

In a joint statement explaining their position during the first round of voting at the First Committee, the UK, US and France wrote: “[Operative paragraph 6] requests that states that have used depleted uranium in armed conflict to provide information about its use. We have serious doubts on the relevance of such a request, according to IHL [International Humanitarian Law]. We consider that it is up to each state to provide data at such a time and in such a manner as it deems appropriate.”

The attempt by these countries to try and conflate the resolution with IHL has been challenged by legal specialists, who pointed out that it is not a question of whether it is appropriate under IHL but rather whether the request in itself is reasonable. It is clear that 148 states felt that it was.

Contaminated hotpot, Hadzici, Bosnia
Gamma radiation at 40x background from decay products from a 30mm depleted uranium round under tarmac 15 years after it was fired, Hadzici, BiH.

Reacting to the vote, an ICBUW spokesperson said: “It is abundantly clear that even the most conservative mitigation measures are made much more difficult by the failure of states to promptly identify where the weapons have been used.

"The US, UK and France’s ongoing apparent policy of non or limited disclosure is outrageous and at odds with their legal obligations to protect civilians and the environment during and after conflict.

"The feebleness of their attempted justification for their position makes clear that they have few concerns over the long-term impact of these munitions on civilians, and are instead solely interested in protecting their toxic and outdated weapons. This is the strongest level of support for a resolution on this issue yet and we believe it reflects a growing impatience with the users of these weapons.”

On learning of the results, UK campaigners reacted angrily, accusing the UK government of hypocrisy and of ignoring the wishes of its own parliament. In the run up to the vote, 90 Members of Parliament had signed a motion calling on the government to support the resolution, while representatives from all the main UK parties had written to the press to highlight the text.

A spokesperson for the UK Uranium Weapons Network said: “The UK’s decision to vote against the resolution is extremely disappointing. Sites contaminated by land mines, cluster munitions or depleted uranium all represent a post-conflict hazard to civilians.

"All these sites require remedial work and, as a vast majority of states recognise, including those states that have had to endure the impact of these weapons, this work is impossible without full transparency over where the weapons have been used.”

As with previous years, the resolution was submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition to the general call for transparency, it also recognised the importance of implementing recommendations by UN agencies to help mitigate the hazards from depleted uranium. Discussion over the long-term impact of these weapons is ongoing but the World Health Organisation and International Atomic Energy Agency both call for sites to be marked, and where necessary decontaminated. The United Nations Environment Programme has called for a precautionary approach to the use of the weapons due to ongoing uncertainties about the environmental behaviour of uranium contamination.

Resolutions passed in 2007 and 2008 accepted the potential risk from depleted uranium weapons and called for more focused research on affected states. This research has been hindered the lack of transparency from users.

The full list of abstainers is as follows: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Micronesia, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine. A full voting record can be downloaded below:

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martedì 28 dicembre 2010

Rich White Men Are Most Likely to Survive Nuclear Blast

AlterNet / By Ira Chernus

Government Report: Rich White Men Are Most Likely to Survive Nuclear Blast
That’s just one of the startling revelations found in 'Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation,' a 130-page report prepared with your tax dollars.
AlterNet, December 27, 2010 |


Good news! You’ve got a pretty good chance of surviving a terrorist’s nuclear blast in your city -- especially if you’re a rich white man. Women, ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic classes are more likely to be “stricken by psychiatric disorders,” and once they start going crazy they’re less likely to survive.

That’s just one of the startling revelations in the new second edition of “Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation,” a 130-page report produced, thanks to your tax dollars, by the Obama administration's National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats. (I’m not making this up, honest.)

And there’s more good news. Even if you are not rich, white and male, a nuke detonated in a major U.S. city is “is more survivable than most people think.” That’s what “an official deeply involved in the planning” told the New York Times’ William Broad, that intrepid reporter of all things nuclear, who broke the story.

If you are a fan of Kafka or Alice in Wonderland, you might want to read the whole report for yourself (though first you’ll have to memorize the 50-plus acronyms it uses). For the rest of you, here are just a few of the more surreal tidbits:

If a terrorist detonates a nuclear weapon in your city, you’ll have “a few seconds” after seeing the flash “to take limited protective measures.” But “five seconds … is enough time for a person with the right information to seek basic shelter (e.g., duck and cover),” the authors assure us, although they admit that when the government promoted “duck and cover” during the Cold War era it left the public “skeptical of preparedness messages.” Are you skeptical yet?

You can get “the right information” from this report, stuff you might not have figured out on your own, like “Survivors should not seek shelter in buildings that are on fire.”

And there will be plenty of buildings on fire, especially in the MD (Moderate Damage) zone, estimated to be a half-mile to a mile from the blast point. (The SD [Severe Damage] zone, within a half-mile of ground zero, will be obliterated, so it gets little attention in this manual for emergency responders.) In the MD “fires fed by broken gas lines, ruptured fuel tanks, and other sources will be prevalent … a major threat to survivors” and to responders rushing to the rescue.

Nevertheless, “search and rescue missions should be practicable in the MD zone,” and “many casualties will survive.” The MD will be “the focus of early life-saving operations,” since that’s where survivors “will benefit most from urgent medical care.”

Responders apparently won’t be deterred by the fires, nor by the “elevated radiation levels, unstable buildings and other structures, downed power lines, ruptured gas lines, hazardous (perhaps airborne) chemicals, sharp metal objects, broken glass … substantial rubble and crashed and overturned vehicles in streets.”

“Passage of rescue vehicles [will be] difficult or impossible” in the MD. “It will take a concerted effort to get responder resources to keep pushing forward.” Their path will have to be cleared by “heavy equipment and debris removal capabilities.” Oh, and “radiation levels in the MD zone may be very high.” All in all, “responder units within one or two miles from ground zero may be compromised or completely nonfunctional” while thousands lie dying.

The responders will be moving in from the LD (Low Damage) zone, where the streets will be filled with broken glass, but anyone wounded by the flying glass will be ignored as long as they are “ambulatory.” Of course responders will face that pesky little problem of EMP (electromagnetic pulse): “Communications equipment (cell towers, etc.) electronics destroyed or disrupted, computer equipment electrical components destroyed, control systems electrical components destroyed, water and electrical system control components destroyed or disrupted, and other electronic devices damage.” Up to four miles from ground zero, “it may be days before communications capabilities are reestablished. Within this area, all communications capabilities will be destroyed or severely hindered.”

Yet the report is filled with detailed plans for “search and rescue missions” and “urgent medical care” somehow being carried out in the MD, all supposedly coordinated with impressive precision by “incident commanders,” because “delays in issuing and implementing recommendations (or orders) could result in a large number of unnecessary fatalities.” How they’ll get all those orders issued with no functioning communication system remains unexplained.

As the Citizen Corps Web site points out, “given the daytime population density of a large modern city, the number that would be hurt by prompt effects of the blast or threatened by fallout particles could be in the hundreds of thousands.” And it’s obvious that in the real world -- as opposed to the report’s fantasy world -- the vast majority would get no medical care and thus would die.

But wait. There is still more good news: “Response capabilities more than five miles away from ground zero are likely to be only nominally affected by blast and EMP and should be able to mobilize and respond, provided they are not within the path of dangerous fallout levels.” And the DF (Dangerous Fallout) zone will extend only a mere “10 - 20 miles” (though there will be a “larger contaminated area beyond the DF zone” too). What’s more, all the dangerous fallout will come down “within about 24 hours.” So the millions in that zone will be pretty safe if they quickly get inside the closest “robust shelter” and stay there for more than a day. (That includes survivors in the MD, apparently -- if they can find any robust buildings that aren’t burning.)

Of course “effective decontamination” is required before entering a shelter. What’s “effective”? At one point, the report says that “simply brushing off outer garments will be sufficient to protect oneself and others.” But at other points the advice is quite different: “Remove clothes and shower … place your clothing in a plastic bag and seal or tie the bag … put on clean clothing, if available.”

No clean clothes (and probably no showers) in that handy shelter building? Don’t worry. All those naked folks can “assume that the dominant behavioral response will likely be … pro-social, altruistic behaviors.” Why, it might even be fun.

Sooner or later, “effective decontamination methods that are easiest to implement” will begin: vacuuming, fire hosing, steam cleaning, and the like. If that doesn’t work, the authorities will proceed to “sandblasting” and “road resurfacing.” As they say in Australia, no worries, mate.

To be fair, the report does admit there are some big problems to solve: “People will not be able to discern which shelters are more adequate than others.” Plus there’s “the natural instinct to run from danger” rather than duck into the nearest building. The answer is advance education, now: “Response planners should implement public messaging prior to the disaster.”

One good way to get the word out is to target “grade school students who can bring the information home … in the form of school calendars and book bags labeled with safety tips.” And parents should be informed about schools’ plans to keep their kids “sheltered-in-place” -- even though (in bold letters) “procedures that separate children from parents will be unsuccessful.”

By the way, all this planning assumes only a 10-kiloton explosion, which puts “several hundred thousand people at risk of death” if they don’t get the word about shelter within a few minutes. Of course 10K is a mere firecracker in terms of today’s nuclear arsenals. But the study assumes terrorists won’t be able to manage anything bigger.

Why make such an assumption? I found a clue in my research on President Eisenhower's approach to nuclear danger. Ike was determined that in case of a nuclear attack the U.S. should be prepared for “digging ourselves out of ashes, starting again,” and winning a nuclear war. “If we assumed too much damage,” he told subordinates, “there would be little point in planning.” So he directed civil defense planners to keep their “assumptions as to the extent of damage within limits which provide a basis for feasible planning,” rather than dealing with what would really happen. Maybe the same unreality prevails in the Obama administration?

Today’s planners certainly sound a lot like Eisenhower, who wanted to teach Americans to be “resolute survivors… a concerted national effort at patriotic renewal and spiritual advance.” The big problem, in his view, was “how you get people to face such a possibility without getting hysterical.”

In 2010, the head of FEMA told the Times’ William Broad: “We have to get past the mental block that says it’s too terrible to think about. … We have to be ready to deal with it.” The director for preparedness policy at the National Security Council declared that the administration wants “to enhance national resilience --- to withstand disruption, adapt to change and rapidly recover.”

Broad seems eager to promote the upbeat message: “The big surprise was how taking shelter for as little as several hours made a huge difference in survival rates. ‘This has been a game changer,' Brooke Buddemeier, a Livermore health physicist, told a Los Angeles conference.” If everyone living a mile or more from ground zero of an attack took shelter “at the core of a big office building or in an underground garage, ‘We’d have no significant exposures,’ Mr. Buddemeier told the conference, and thus virtually no casualties from fallout.”

Of course they’d actually have to stay sheltered for at least 24 hours and maybe “several days,” according to the report -- without food, many bleeding from the flying glass, some blinded from seeing the flash. Then there would be all those women, ethnic minorities, and lower socioeconomic folks who would be going crazy. Oh, and did I mention that “many people will be relocated for months to years at great distances downwind?” The report mentions it only very incidentally. No worries, mate.

Reading this report reminded me of my days doing research in the Eisenhower Library, trying to master the art of laughing and crying at the same time. The tragedy of Eisenhower was that, as he created an image of a president pursuing peace, he blocked possibilities for disarmament and Cold War reconciliation at every turn. Instead he expanded the nuclearized military-industrial complex (and then on his last day in office fooled history into thinking he opposed it) while making fantasy plans for surviving and winning a nuclear war.

Now the Obama administration wants us to learn to accept the prospect of a major American city destroyed. Its report never even mentions the possibility of averting disaster by changing the U.S. policies that enrage people, whether abroad or at home. Maybe the administration has another interagency task force working on that problem.

But I doubt it. They would have to treat those who dream of using nukes as monstrous people who may nonetheless have rational grievances worth paying attention to. Remember that our own government has reams of plans to use nukes in the worst-case scenario if its grievances are ignored. But the fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy since World War II has been to divide all humanity into two groups: people like us, the good guys, who are by definition rational even when planning to use, or actually using, nuclear weapons; and the bad guys, the irrational evildoers bent on wreaking destruction for the sake of destruction. In that scenario, there’s no point in even thinking about the bad guys’ motivating grievances, much less trying to address them constructively.

No administration can even hint at challenging that principle and hope to get its leader re-elected. Politically it’s so much safer just to spread the good news that a nuke in your city is more survivable than you thought -- especially if you’re a rich white man.
Ira Chernus is professor of religious studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder and author of “The Real Eisenhower. Read more of his writing on his blog: http://chernus.wordpress.com.
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Complotti CIA, rivelazioni a prova di Bomba

Complotti CIA, rivelazioni a prova di Bomba
di Giulietto Chiesa - 27/12/2010

Fonte: megachip

intelligennucl

Avviso ai lettori di questa nota. Vorremmo inaugurare una nuova serie di commenti e analisi, dedicata interamente ai “negazionisti del complotto”. Cioè a quei signori che, per incultura politica totale, ovvero per introiettata, supina acquiescenza alle fonti ufficiali (il riferimento è, in questo caso, ai giornalisti mancati) si affannano, ogni volta che qualcuno cerca una spiegazione ai fatti che occorrono nella vita reale, ad accusarlo di “complottismo”.

Categorie, le sopra elencate, assai numerose, oltre che oltremodo dannose per la convivenza umana. Salvo che per un aspetto: che allietano la nostra esistenza con inaspettate capriole, gag, involontaria esibizione di comica insipienza, della qual cosa siamo loro moderatamente grati.

E veniamo al dunque. Il giornale più complottista del mondo – così ci pare di poterlo definire dopo la rivelazione dei nove banchieri nove che si riuniscono una volta al mese a South Manhattan, nei pressi di Wall Street, per decidere i destini, finanziari e non, del pianeta – (s’intende il New York Times), appena messo piede nella Grande Mela, mi gratifica di un altro episodio principe di complottismo al quadrato. Con un titolo in prima pagina che è tutto un programma, il New York Times ci aiutava a trascorrere in pace il Natale e il Capodanno: «I segreti della CIA potrebbero affacciarsi in un procedimento penale svizzero».

Ohibò, dico io. Sarà mica un altro episodio della saga di Wikileaks?

No, state tranquilli. Wikileaks non c’entra. C’entra un magistrato svizzero, nome Andreas Müller, Carneade che vuol mettersi nei guai, che ha scoperto, dopo due anni d’indagini, i seguenti, succulenti retroscena (leggi complotti).

Retroscena uno: c’era un gruppetto di operatori economici, composto da padre, e due figli, tali Friedrich Tiller (padre) e Urs e Marco (figli), che aiutarono, per anni, l’architetto della bomba nucleare pakistana, A.Q.Khan, a smerciare i suoi segreti verso la Corea del Nord, verso l’Iran, verso la Libia, insomma impiegati per conto della nota sequela di “stati canaglia” come ebbe a definirli, a suo tempo, George Bush Junior.

Impiegati si fa per dire, perchè presero decine, probabilmente centinaia di milioni di dollari per questi servigi.

Va bene, direte, ma che c’entra la CIA? Ecco il retroscena due. I Tiller lavoravano anche per la CIA. E, s’intende, prendevano decine di milioni anche per questo secondo servigio. Ma come? – direbbero Pier Luigi Battista, o Ferruccio Bello, vuoi forse affermare che era la CIA che controllava lo smercio di tecnologie nucleari? Risposta difficile a darsi. Forse che sì, forse che anche.

Fatto sta che la CIA pare abbia fatto fuoco e fiamme per impedire che l’inchiesta del signor Andreas Mueller andasse in porto. Scrive il New York Times che “l’Amministrazione Bush ha fatto pressioni straordinarie per proteggere i Tiller da ogni investigazione, arrivando al punto di persuadere le autorità svzzere a distruggere equipaggiamenti e informazioni che erano state scoperte nei loro computers”.

In effetti pare che ci siano riusciti solo in parte, ma quanto basta per fare sbottare il detto Mueller:

il governo svizzero – ha detto il giovedì prima di Natale, illustrando ai giornalisti un rapporto di 174 pagine – “ha interferito massicciamente sul corso della giustizia, distruggendo quasi tutte le prove”.

Così abbiamo conferma di un piccolo complotto dentro un grande complotto: il governo svizzero è sovrano, su certe questioni, come Gianni Riotta è un frate francescano, o Augusto Minzolini un agente di viaggi nel Mar dei Caraibi.

E veniamo al retroscena principale (come lo chiameremo se non complotto, visto che avveniva, ma fuori da ogni legge e, soprattutto, fuori da ogni pubblicità?): com’è che la CIA usava i Tiller?

Lasciava che passassero i disegni delle bombe a chi li aveva commissionati, ma ogni tanto – senti senti l’astuzia ! – infilavano in quei disegni, o in quelle apparecchiature, dei “difetti”, o dei bugs, che avrebbero potuto sia provocare disastri in corso di fabbricazione, sia fornire informazioni circa la prosecuzione dei “lavori” di costruzione delle bombe. Naturalmente, in questo modo, la CIA poteva ostacolare il procedimento. Ma resta il fatto che la CIA sapeva tutto in anticipo di quanto stava avvenendo. A quanto risulta al magistrato svizzero, in molti casi disegni e documentazione essenziale sono stati lasciati “passare” con il beneplacito del servizio segreto americano. Il che spiega perfettamente, adesso, perchè gli Stati Uniti non vogliono che la verità venga a galla, e proteggono i Tiller.

Questo è il punto. Se si scoprisse la verità, ogni volta che si alza l’allarme atomico, sia esso in Nord Corea, sia in Iran, potremmo subito ringraziare gli Stati Uniti d’America per il cospicuo contributo da essi dato alle bombe atomiche dei paesi canaglia.

Ma c’è un altro punto da far emergere, ad uso e consumo dei “negazionisti dei complotti”. Questa storia ci dice, a chiare lettere, che non c’è azione eversiva, gruppo terroristico, atto terroristico vero e proprio, operazione di diversione, complotto, crisi di governo, che non sia monitorato accuratamente dai servizi segreti americani.

Onnipotenti? Niente affatto, perchè non si può essere contemporaneamente onnipotenti e stupidi. Ma molto presenti, e molto ricchi, questo sì, lo si può affermare. Quindi, quando scoppiano le bombe, siano esse atomiche o al plastico, chiedetevi sempre, voi che non siete “negazionisti del complotto”, quanto di ciò che sarebbe accaduto probabilmente sapevano in anticipo i servizi segreti americani. Naturalmente tutto questo non c’entra nulla con l’11 settembre del 2001.
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