Hello All,

It appears a very serious "near miss" accident, that could have seriously injured and killed many down in Texas, is making the news with videos and even some official CSB complaints of too little protection. Had that white plume of HF laden water vapor headed into the town it would have killed and injured lots of people. HF is very absorbed via skin contact and air inhalation and it highly affects cellular enzymes in the long term causing sickness and even causes heart attacks in the short term with calcium channel effects on the heart.

You can read where the refinery has tried to invoke "National Security" as a reason to cover up these dangerous risk factors associated with HF, just as DOE has done for decades around gas diffusion plants. Refinery risk for kill zones around refineries, like this one, run out to around a 30 mile radius, and are highly hushed up risks by industry.

What they, DOE and HF industry, don't tell everyone, is the risks from an operating DOE gas diffusion plant was a thousand times this factor, due to the simple fact they held in suspension thousands of tons of gaseous UF-6 that will convert almost instantly, due to plane crashes, bombs, or earthquakes, into lots of HF gas and cause huge heavier than air poisonous white clouds to form and engulf regions the plants and around them. There were even more risks from earthquakes opening up the huge systems or toppling rows to DUF-6 cylinders to air and more HF releases. The risks associated with HF releases are still the largest and most hushed up of the health risks for DOE workers and even the risks for total kill zones that would affect entire cities and regions have been covered up.

It is past time for DOE to release all the "Project F" documents from the Manhattan Project that conceal all these extreme risks the Manhattan Project allowed to get the nuclear bomb, plus it is time they admit the long term health effects that HF has had on gas diffusion and other like HF exposed workers in industry.

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http://www.ogj.com/index/article-display/5076293181/articles/oil-gas-journal/processing-2/refining/2009/12/csb-issues_urgent.html

CSB issues urgent recommendations in probe of Citgo refinery fire

Dec 10, 2009

Nick Snow
OGJ Washington Editor

WASHINGTON, DC, Dec. 10 -- The US Chemical Safety Board issued urgent safety recommendations to Citgo Petroleum Corp., calling on the refiner to immediately improve the emergency water system at its Corpus Christi, Tex., refinery and to perform third-party audits of hydrogen fluoride units there and at its Lemont, Ill., refinery.

The federal agency took the action as it continued investigating a July 19 release of potentially deadline HF vapor which apparently caused an explosion and fire. CSB issues urgent recommendations before final investigations are completed in cases where its board members identify a potentially imminent hazard that might cause serious harm unless promptly rectified.

It said that on the day of the accident, hydrocarbons and hydrogen fluoride were suddenly released from the HF alkylation unit at Citgo’s 163,000-b/d Corpus Christi plant. The hydrocarbons ignited, leading to a fire which burned for several days and critically injured one employee.

CSB said its investigators determined that a blockage of liquid caused by the sudden failure of a control valve led to violent shaking in the process recycle piping, which broke threaded pipe connections and released a hydrocarbon cloud. That cloud reached an adjacent unit and ignited, causing multiple additional fires and the release of approximately 42,000 lb of HF from equipment and piping within the unit.

CSB said that the refinery used a water spray system to absorb the released HF but added that at least 4,000 lb likely escaped into the atmosphere.

Supply ran low
Investigators determined that during the first day of response, Citgo nearly exhausted the water mitigation system’s stored supply and began pumping salt water from the ship channel into the refinery’s water supply about 11.5 hr after the initial release. They said multiple failures occurred during the saltwater transfer, including ruptures of the barge-to-shore transfer hoses and water pump engine failures.

“Investigators found that the Citgo water mitigation system serves as the last line of defense to protect the Corpus Christi community from an HF release,” CSB Investigations Supervisor Robert Hall said.

The CSB’s urgent recommendations call on Citgo to develop and initiate plans within 30 days to ensure that the refinery’s HF mitigation system has an adequate emergency water supply. They also ask the company to report planned or completed actions to the refinery terminal fire company and local emergency planning committee every 30 days until all planned activities are fully implemented.

An additional urgent recommendation called on Citgo to commission independent, third-party audits of its two HF alkylation units at the Corpus Christi refinery and its 167,000 b/d plant in Lemont. CSB said the audits should compare safety practices at the alkylation units to those recommended by the American Petroleum Institute. Investigators said Citgo has never conducted such an audit of the units despite an existing industry recommendation for audits every 3 years.

Video released
The federal agency also released video of the initial pipe failure, release, ignition, and fire as captured by two refinery surveillance cameras. “The camera footage shows the release and spread of the flammable vapor cloud and the moment when the flammable vapor was ignited,” said CSB Chairman John S. Bresland. “It shows just how severe the release and fire were during this incident.”

He noted that the company objected, saying that releasing the information would raise substantial national security issues and sensationalize the accident. CSB subsequently received affirmation from the US Department of Homeland Security that the video did not fall under classifications requiring protection from disclosure. It is available online at CSB’s web site, www.chemsafety.gov.

Bresland cited a law passed by Congress following secrecy claims by Bayer CropScience in Institute, W.Va. The American Communities’ Right to Public Information Act, he said, “states that national security classifications may not be used to conceal corporate errors, prevent embarrassment, or improperly delay the release of information to the public.”

Contact Nick Snow at nicks@pennwell.com.

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