Decessi di Militari per malattie tumorali

SINDACATO UNITARIO PENSIONATI IN UNIFORME

Roma, 17 ottobre 2011

Oggetto: Decessi di Militari per malattie tumorali

 Signor Presidente della Repubblica,

Le scrivo nella mia veste di Presidente del SUPU (Sindacato Unitario Pensionati in Uniforme), organizzazione sindacale apartitica e apolitica, che si è costituita tra gli appartenenti, non in attività di servizio, dell’Arma dei Carabinieri, della Polizia di Stato, della Guardia di Finanza, della Polizia Penitenziaria, del Corpo Forestale dello Stato, dell’Esercito Italiano, della Marina Militare, dell’Aeronautica Militare, delle Capitanerie di Porto, delle Polizie Municipali, dei Vigili del Fuoco, della Croce Rossa Italiana, delle Polizie Locali, delle Vigilanze Private, di quanti altri hanno comunque prestato servizio presso le Amministrazioni della Difesa, degli Interni e della Giustizia e degli Enti pubblici territoriali negli specifici ambiti, nonché presso gli Enti comunque erogatori di pubblici servizi, dei titolari delle relative pensioni di reversibilità, e si ispira alla concezione e alla tradizione sindacale italiana, che opera per l’emancipazione dei lavoratori e dei pensionati e per la tutela della loro dignità, professionalità e sicurezza nel mondo del lavoro.

Negli ultimi tempi sono stato più volte interessato da molti familiari di militari che sono deceduti a seguito di gravi malattie tumorali, contratte mentre espletavano il loro servizio in località in cui le forze della NATO utilizzavano materiali esplosivi, fra cui bombe, impregnati di uranio impoverito  o di metalli pesanti, la cui pericolosità per la salute umana è allo studio di diverse commissioni di esperti, senza alcun esito.

Sembrerebbe che le malattie tumorali possano dipendere dalla prolungata esposizione a varie sostanze (quindi non solo l’uranio impoverito) che comunque producono gli stessi effetti, con il decesso di coloro che le aspirano o le assorbono.

Quando svolgevo il mio servizio nell’Arma dei Carabinieri, nel primo incontro con il personale dipendente, facevo presente che un buon Comandante riceve dallo Stato un numero ben indicato di militari vivi. Era sua somma cura restituirli tutti vivi.

Non mi pare che ciò sia accaduto con taluni Comandanti, che, sebbene fossero a conoscenza della rischiosa esposizione del proprio personale, poco o nulla facevano per segnalare il pericolo e scongiurare ulteriori vittime.

Questo Sindacato, sulla base delle proprie competenze statutarie, ha posto allo studio il fenomeno, al fine di verificare i danni prodotti al personale e di interrompere questa catena di morti, che nessuno ricorda. Eppure sono lavoratori anche loro e muoiono per un alto fine, in quanto tutelano innocenti, soprattutto anziani, donne e bambini, in missioni di pace.

Mi rivolgo a Lei, Signor Presidente della Repubblica, che interviene giustamente con durezza in occasione di morti sul lavoro, affinché il Ministro della Difesa si occupi di questi morti dimenticati con serietà ed impegno istituendo un gruppo di lavoro per lo studio del fenomeno e per la individuazione delle cause che originano questi decessi, anche al fine di trovare i giusti rimedi.

Questo Sindacato, unico a rappresentare tutti i lavoratori e pensionati in uniforme, sulla base dei principi della concertazione, si dichiara disponibile a partecipare a questo gruppo di lavoro.

Molte mamme e molti papà, che hanno avuto i loro figlioli morti, in giovane età, in queste sciagurate circostanze, mi hanno espresso il desiderio di potere essere ricevuti da Lei, per rappresentare a colui che è indicato dalla Carta Costituzionale quale Comandante Supremo delle Forze Armate, il loro dolore e la loro indignazione per la sottovalutazione di un fenomeno così grave.

Certo di un Suo autorevole intervento, La saluto con molta cordialità e la stima di sempre

Il Presidente del SUPU

(Gen. Antonio Pappalardo)

TEPCO Slated to Build Plants in Texas

TruthOut.org / By Greg Palast

Obama recently asked Congress for a $4 billion loan guarantee for two new nuclear reactors on the Gulf Coast of Texas -- involving Tokyo Electric Power.
Japanese Company Responsible for Nuclear Catastrophe Is Slated to Build Plants in Texas

March 14, 2011

I need to speak to you, not as a reporter, but in my former capacity as lead investigator in several government nuclear plant fraud and racketeering investigations.

I don't know the law in Japan, so I can't tell you if Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO) can plead insanity to the homicides about to happen.

But what will Obama plead? The Administration, just months ago, asked Congress to provide a $4 billion loan guarantee for two new nuclear reactors to be built and operated on the Gulf Coast of Texas -- by Tokyo Electric Power and local partners. As if the Gulf hasn't suffered enough.

Here are the facts about Tokyo Electric and the industry you haven't heard on CNN:

The failure of emergency systems at Japan's nuclear plants comes as no surprise to those of us who have worked in the field.

Nuclear plants the world over must be certified for what is called "SQ" or "Seismic Qualification." That is, the owners swear that all components are designed for the maximum conceivable shaking event, be it from an earthquake or an exploding Christmas card from Al Qaeda.

The most inexpensive way to meet your SQ is to lie. The industry does it all the time. The government team I worked with caught them once, in 1988, at the Shoreham plant in New York. Correcting the SQ problem at Shoreham would have cost a cool billion, so engineers were told to change the tests from 'failed' to 'passed.'

The company that put in the false safety report? Stone & Webster, now the nuclear unit of Shaw Construction which will work with Tokyo Electric to build the Texas plant, Lord help us.

There's more.

Last night I heard CNN reporters repeat the official line that the tsunami disabled the pumps needed to cool the reactors, implying that water unexpectedly got into the diesel generators that run the pumps.

These safety back-up systems are the 'EDGs' in nuke-speak: Emergency Diesel Generators. That they didn't work in an emergency is like a fire department telling us they couldn't save a building because "it was on fire."

What dim bulbs designed this system? One of the reactors dancing with death at Fukushima Station 1 was built by Toshiba. Toshiba was also an architect of the emergency diesel system.

Now be afraid. Obama's $4 billion bail-out-in-the-making is called the South Texas Project. It's been sold as a red-white-and-blue way to make power domestically with a reactor from Westinghouse, a great American brand. However, the reactor will be made substantially in Japan by the company that bought the US brand name, Westinghouse -- Toshiba.

I once had a Toshiba computer. I only had to send it in once for warranty work. However, it's kind of hard to mail back a reactor with the warranty slip inside the box if the fuel rods are melted and sinking halfway to the earth's core.

TEPCO and Toshiba don't know what my son learned in 8th grade science class: tsunamis follow Pacific Rim earthquakes. So these companies are real stupid, eh? Maybe. More likely is that the diesels and related systems wouldn't have worked on a fine, dry afternoon.

Back in the day, when we checked the emergency back-up diesels in America, a mind-blowing number flunked. At the New York nuke, for example, the builders swore under oath that their three diesel engines were ready for an emergency. They'd been tested. The tests were faked, the diesels run for just a short time at low speed. When the diesels were put through a real test under emergency-like conditions, the crankshaft on the first one snapped in about an hour, then the second and third. We nicknamed the diesels, "Snap, Crackle and Pop."

(Note: Moments after I wrote that sentence, word came that two of three diesels failed at the Tokai Station as well.)

In the US, we supposedly fixed our diesels after much complaining by the industry. But in Japan, no one tells Tokyo Electric to do anything the Emperor of Electricity doesn't want to do.

I get lots of confidential notes from nuclear industry insiders. One engineer, a big name in the field, is especially concerned that Obama waved the come-hither check to Toshiba and Tokyo Electric to lure them to America. The US has a long history of whistleblowers willing to put themselves on the line to save the public. In our racketeering case in New York, the government only found out about the seismic test fraud because two courageous engineers, Gordon Dick and John Daly, gave our team the documentary evidence.

In Japan, it's simply not done. The culture does not allow the salary-men, who work all their their lives for one company, to drop the dime.

Not that US law is a wondrous shield: both engineers in the New York case were fired and blacklisted by the industry. Nevertheless, the government (local, state, federal) brought civil racketeering charges against the builders. The jury didn't buy the corporation's excuses and, in the end, the plant was, thankfully, dismantled.

Am I on some kind of xenophobic anti-Nippon crusade? No. In fact, I'm far more frightened by the American operators in the South Texas nuclear project, especially Shaw. Stone & Webster, now the Shaw nuclear division, was also the firm that conspired to fake the EDG tests in New York. (The company's other exploits have been exposed by their former consultant, John Perkins, in his book, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man.)

If the planet wants to shiver, consider this: Toshiba and Shaw have recently signed a deal to become world-wide partners in the construction of nuclear stations.

The other characters involved at the South Texas Plant that Obama is backing should also give you the willies. But as I'm in the middle of investigating the American partners, I'll save that for another day.

So, if we turned to America's own nuclear contractors, would we be safe? Well, two of the melting Japanese reactors, including the one whose building blew sky high, were built by General Electric of the Good Old US of A.

After Texas, you're next. The Obama Administration is planning a total of $56 billion in loans for nuclear reactors all over America.

And now, the homicides:

CNN is only interested in body counts, how many workers burnt by radiation, swept away or lost in the explosion. These plants are now releasing radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Be skeptical about the statements that the "levels are not dangerous." These are the same people who said these meltdowns could never happen. Over years, not days, there may be a thousand people, two thousand, ten thousand who will suffer from cancers induced by this radiation.

In my New York investigation, I had the unhappy job of totaling up post-meltdown "morbidity" rates for the county government. It would be irresponsible for me to estimate the number of cancer deaths that will occur from these releases without further information; but it is just plain criminal for the Tokyo Electric shoguns to say that these releases are not dangerous. Indeed, the fact that residents near the Japanese nuclear plants were not issued iodine pills to keep at the ready shows TEPCO doesn't care who lives and who dies whether in Japan or the USA. The carcinogenic isotopes that are released at Fukushima are already floating to Seattle with effects we simply cannot measure.

Heaven help us. Because Obama won't.


Greg Palast is the author of the New York Times bestseller The Best Democracy Money Can Buy." View Palast's reports for BBC TV and Democracy Now! at gregpalast.com.

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• > L'ex-soldat Lacoste veut recevoir des traitements en Italie 

Publié le 20 novembre 2011 à 05h00 | Mis à jour le 20 novembre 2011 à 05h00

L'ex-soldat Lacoste veut recevoir des traitements en Italie

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À LIRE AUSSI

• L'ex-soldat Lacoste craint d'être discrédité par Ottawa
• Martelly amorce le rétablissement de l'armée haïtienne
• Israël: les colons plus enclins à combattre dans  l'armée
• Les Égyptiens manifestent contre le pouvoir militaire
• Armée en Haïti: une initiative «prématurée», selon Ottawa

SUR LE MÊME THÈME

• ministère des Anciens Combattants | 
• Forces armées

DU MÊME AUTEUR

• Avenir des Coyotes à Glendale: un dossier à régler d'ici la fin de l'année
• Occupons Québec: l'argent au coeur des débats des indignés
• Athlètes de la région de Québec: emballés par les X Games
• Ex-soldat Lacoste: il veut recevoir ses traitements en Italie
• Pascal Lacoste déçu: l'ex-soldat craint qu'Anciens Combattants Canada tente de le discréditer

Ian Bussières Le Soleil

L'ex-militaire Pascal Lacoste annoncera cette semaine qu'il crée une fondation afin d'amasser l'argent nécessaire afin qu'il puisse recevoir des traitements en Italie pour une intoxication à l'uranium appauvri, des traitements qui pourraient ensuitelui servir à intenter des poursuites contre le gouvernement du Canada.

«J'ai parlé à mon avocat, et mon plan de match est très simple : je vais mettre une fondation sur pied pour aller me faire traiter en Italie, car ce pays reconnaît depuis 2008 que des soldats ont été intoxiqués à l'uranium appauvri et les traite en conséquence», a-t-il dévoilé.

L'ancien soldat souhaite se rendre là-bas en compagnie d'un archiviste qui rédigerait un rapport détaillé. Il subirait d'abord divers tests et analyses, se soumettrait ensuite à un traitement et subirait de nouveaux tests et analyses une fois ce traitement complété.

«Si je vais en Italie avec un archiviste crédible, je pourrai ensuite utiliser ces données pour «challenger» le gouvernement canadien jusqu'en Cour suprême pour qu'il reconnaisse enfin que des soldats canadiens ont souffert d'avoir été exposés à l'uranium appauvri», ajoute celui qui dit mener ce combat pour tous ses frères d'armes.

«J'accepte d'être le cobaye, et l'énergie que je retrouverai après avoir reçu mon traitement, je m'en servirai pour me battre afin que soit enfin reconnue cette intoxication», enchaîne celui qui prétend avoir été intoxiqué lors d'une mission en Bosnie en 1996 et 1997.

Uranium appauvri

Depuis cette mission, Pascal Lacoste souffre de plusieurs problèmes de santé, dont de la fatigue et des douleurs chroniques, et il est convaincu que l'uranium appauvri est également la cause de sa stérilité.

L'Organisation mondiale de la santé a réalisé de nombreuses études sur la dangerosité de l'uranium appauvri, mais aucune n'a fait de lien avec les problèmes de santé dont certains militaires disent souffrir.

De son côté, le ministère des Anciens Combattants justifie sa position en s'appuyant sur les conclusions d'études américaines selon lesquelles des soldats fortement exposés à l'uranium appauvri, entre autres ceux qui vivent avec des éclats d'obus contaminés à cet élément, n'en auraient conservé aucune séquelle.

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  [ Politique ]

  L'ex-soldat Lacoste craint d'être discrédité par Ottawa

  (20/11/11) L'ex-soldat Pascal Lacoste, qui a récemment fait une grève de la faim de quatre jours pour sensibiliser le gouvernement canadien à l'intoxication... »

ALERTE en cours à Fukushima

ALERTE en cours à Fukushima : L'architecte du réacteur 3 met en garde contre une explosion massive hydrovolcanique

* Notez que les niveaux d'iode 131 sont en hausse en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, laissant crainte à moyen et long terme une contamination généralisée...  Nous sommes assis sur des bombes nucléaires!

Dans cette interview, il a admis que l'explication de TEPCO n'avait pas de sens, et que le syndrome chinois était inévitable !!!

Il a déclaré que, compte tenu des huits mois passé sans aucune amélioration, il était inévitable que le combustible fondu soit sorti de l'enceinte de confinement et qu'il ait coulé sous terre, ce qui est appelé le syndrome Chinois.

De ce fait lorsque le combustible atteindra une veine d'eau souterraine, cela provoquera la contamination des eaux souterraines, la contamination des sols et la contamination de la mer. Par ailleurs, si les veines d'eau souterraines continuent à être chauffées pendant longtemps, une explosion massive de type hydrovolcanique pourrait arriver.

Il a également averti que les débris radioactifs continuent de se répandre dans l'océan Pacifique. Et que ces tonnes de débris avaient atteint les îles Marshall depuis le 15 novembre...

Source:
http://fukushima-diary.com/2011/11/architect-of-reactor-3-warns-massive-hydrovolcanic-explosion/

Italian Nuclear Material: Sogin Response To Gtri Action Paper

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #183899  ? 
Subject Italian Nuclear Material: Sogin Response To Gtri Action Paper
Origin Embassy Rome (Italy)
Cable time Fri, 19 Dec 2008 08:50 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08ROME1538.html
References 08ROME1528
History First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras ? Comments
VZCZCXRO0549
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DE RUEHRO #1538/01 3540850
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R 190850Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1338
INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3341
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9713
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3507
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0138
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 4712
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 001538

SIPDIS

ISN/NESS FOR J. MENTZ AND D. FENSTERMACHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: ENRG [Energy and Power], IT [Italy], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], TPHY [Physical Sciences], TRGY [Energy Technology]
SUBJECT: ITALIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL: SOGIN RESPONSE TO GTRI 
ACTION PAPER 

REF: A) ROME 1528 B) 11/26/08 PRESTON-ROBINSON E-MAIL
     C) 07/03/08 STAPLES-PRESTON E-MAIL D) ROME
     287 (NOTAL) E) STATE 15562 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare for
reasons 1.4 (b, d).

¶1.  (U) This cable is classified Confidential (Releasable to
Italy) for transmission purposes.  For the purpose of
discussion with officials of the Government of Italy (GOI)
and wholly-GOI-owned entities such as the Societa Gestione
Impianti Nucleari (SOGIN), the inventory below may be
declassified and marked as "SENSITIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY 
INFORMATION."

¶2.  (SBU) Summary.  Officials of Italian nuclear site
management firm SOGIN welcome the chance to discuss possible
disposition of Italian nuclear "gap" material through the
U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI).  In response to DOE's "Proposed GTRI
Action Paper for SOGIN and ENEA" (ref C), SOGIN provided an
inventory of all of the nuclear material formerly controlled
by Italy's Agency for New Technology, Energy and the
Environment (ENEA), and now controlled by SOGIN.  SOGIN
requests that the USG respond with an official letter,
confirming USG interest in such discussions.  SOGIN's
inventory and cover letter are included below.  Post
recommends that the USG respond promptly, since a potential
reorganization of SOGIN in spring 2009 may make negotiations
after March 2009 infeasible. End summary.

¶3.  (SBU) On 16 October, following a USG-GOI interagency
meeting on nuclear physical protection (ref A), DOE/NNSA
Program Director Phil Robinson and SCICouns met with SOGIN
officials to follow up on ref C request for an updated
inventory of special nuclear material in Italy.  (Ref C
summarizes issues raised during a May GTRI team visit to
Italy; trip planning details are in refs D and E.)  The SOGIN
officials then conducted a thorough review of all of their
holdings of ex-ENEA nuclear material.  The results are
summarized in the tables below.  Note that the tables do not
reflect all special nuclear material present in Italy, nor
all nuclear material under the control of SOGIN.  However,
they do appear to contain significant potential areas for
GTRI-SOGIN cooperation.

Cover letter; USG reply needed
------------------------------

¶4.  (SBU) Per ref B, on 26 November 2008, Mr. Davide Urso of
SOGIN International and Regulatory Affairs delivered to
SCICouns the following letter on SOGIN letterhead:

"Protocol Number 0035984 of 26 November, 2008

Dear Jean,

As a follow-up to the document sent to us in July 2008
(ref B) and to the meeting held in Rome in October 2008,
please find attached the list of materials that could
fall under your proposal.

The list is confidential.

We look forward to receiving your assessment so to proceed
with a deeper technical discussion.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Executive Vice President
Regulatory, Public Affairs and Communication
Gabriele Mazzoletti"

¶5.  (SBU) Urso said that SOGIN now needs a reply from the
USG, on official paper with a colored letterhead (either DOE
or State letterhead will do).  The letter could be very
short, along the lines of: "Thank you for the information.
We are assessing it, and will get back to you with more
concrete proposals soon.  We believe that some of the
material on your list may well meet the criteria for

ROME 00001538  002 OF 004


disposition under the GTRI program, and we look forward to
discussing those options with you further."  Once SOGIN has
received the USG letter, SOGIN will formally consult with GOI
nuclear security authority ISPRA (the Higher Institute for
Environmental Protection and Research) and with EURATOM,
which technically owns the material.   (EURATOM is aware of
the 2008 GTRI-SOGIN preliminary discussions, but SOGIN has
not yet formally notified them.)  Once ISPRA and EURATOM both
bless the proposed negotiations, then SOGIN will be ready to
meet with a GTRI team to discuss actual material transfers,
cost, and logistics.

¶6.  (SBU) The many proposals being discussed in the Italian
Parliament regarding Italy,s return to nuclear power include
provisions for dividing SOGIN into different parts and
putting it under a Commissioner with special authority to
restructure it.  SOGIN management is resisting these
proposals, but the outcome is not yet clear.   Post
recommends that the USG respond to SOGIN promptly, to
increase the chance of concluding negotiations before a
possible SOGIN reorganization, which could begin as soon as
March.

Inventory of Ex-ENEA Nuclear Material Controlled by SOGIN
--------------------------------------------- ------------

¶7.  (C)  Below is the inventory attached to VP Mazzoletti's
letter.  The left column indicates the site at which the
material is located.  The AECL facility is in Canada; the
rest are in Italy.  The EUREX facility and the Avogadro
storage site are in Saluggia, northwest of Turin.  The
numbers in parentheses refer to the notes at the bottom of
the table.


Table 1.  EX-ENEA NUCLEAR MATERIAL SUMMARY


-------------------------------
Highly-enriched uranium (grams)
-------------------------------


-                Fresh      Irradiated
CASACCIA
IPU             3465.2            ---

CASACCIA
OPEC               3.1          941.8

ITREC
TRISAIA        15398.4     (2)92414.2

EUREX              9.1         6760.9

AECL               ---           ---

DEPOSITO
AVOGADRO           ---        (5)69.0

TOTAL          18875.8       100185.9



----------------------------
Low-enriched uranium (grams)
----------------------------


-                Fresh      Irradiated
CASACCIA
IPU             6386.9            ---

CASACCIA
OPEC            5182.0     (1)63148.1

ITREC
TRISAIA         2754.0            ---

EUREX           5385.0          185.9

AECL               ---            ---

ROME 00001538  003 OF 004



DEPOSITO
AVOGADRO           ---            ---

TOTAL          19707.9        63334.0



-----------------------
Natural uranium (grams)
-----------------------


-                Fresh      Irradiated
CASACCIA
IPU           (3)96604.6           ---

CASACCIA
OPEC                ---        25964.0

ITREC
TRISAIA        1114042.8           ---

EUREX           251919.2       19612.0

AECL                ---           ---

DEPOSITO
AVOGADRO            ---           ---

TOTAL          1462566.6       45576.0



------------------------
Depleted uranium (grams)
------------------------

-                Fresh      Irradiated
CASACCIA
IPU             199489.6          ---

CASACCIA
OPEC            336850.0          ---

ITREC
TRISAIA        (4)6069.0          ---

EUREX              142.4       1774.0

AECL                 ---          ---

DEPOSITO
AVOGADRO             ---          ---

TOTAL           542551.0       1774.0


-----------------
Plutonium (grams)
-----------------

-                 Fresh     Irradiated
CASACCIA
IPU                5812.9         ---

CASACCIA
OPEC                  0.3       111.8

ITREC
TRISAIA               ---         ---

EUREX               166.3      4679.5

AECL               3176.4         ---

DEPOSITO
AVOGADRO              ---         ---

TOTAL               9155.9     4791.3



ROME 00001538  004 OF 004


NOTES:

(1) Of which 1644.1 g solid waste;

(2) Elk River fuel;

(3) Of which 62398 g solid and liquid waste;

(4) In nitric solution;

(5) Petten plates.

SPOGLI

BELGIAN LAW LEAVES US&NATO UNAFFECTED

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #189253  ? 
Subject Belgian Law Banning Depleted Uranium To Take Effect In June 2009
Origin Embassy Brussels (Belgium)
Cable time Wed, 28 Jan 2009 16:59 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09BRUSSELS124.html
References 07BRUSSELS949, 08BRUSSELS1649
History First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras ? Comments
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHBS #0124/01 0281659
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8518
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0273
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000124

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, L, PM, EUR/RPM AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], MOPS [Military Operations], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], BE [Belgium]
SUBJECT: BELGIAN LAW BANNING DEPLETED URANIUM TO TAKE EFFECT IN JUNE 2009 

REF: A. 07 BRUSSELS 949
     B. STATE 107247
     C. STATE 111744
     D. BRUSSELS 1649

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Richard Eason, reason 1.4(b
) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request, see para 8.

¶2.  (C)  Summary: A law passed in 2007 banning depleted
uranium (DU) munitions and armor-plating will come into
effect in June 2009.  Post requests that the Department (PM,
IO, EUR, ISN, L and other interested bureaus) consider
whether the law could have an effect on transit or storage of
munitions or equipment with DU content by the U.S. or NATO in
Belgium. Post believes that in the future, the law could
influence Belgium's stance on depleted uranium in
multilateral fora and wider public opinion on the issue in
the world.  Post is ready to work with the Department to
craft a strategy to deal with the issue.  End Summary.

¶3. (C)  Belgium has been the center of a strong pacifist
movement since much of the country was devastated by World
War I.  One result of this social and political trend has
been a series of laws that have outlawed the production,
storage and transport of certain weapons, including poison
gas, antipersonnel mines, and cluster munitions.   The latest
in this series of laws is a law that prohibits inert
munitions and armor-plating that contain depleted uranium or
any other type of industrial uranium.  The law was passed in
May 2007 (ref A).  Because of concerns by the Belgian
government then in power about the uncertain state of the
scientific facts regarding the dangers associated with
depleted uranium, the law was written so as to come into
force two years from date of publication, in this case June
20, 2007.    As such, the law will come into effect on June
20, 2009 unless action to reverse is taken by the Belgian
government and Parliament.

¶4. (C) The 2007 law amends the general law on individual and
economic activities with arms (published June 9, 2006) to
state that depleted uranium weapons are prohibited along with
a list of other weapons.  While Article 27 of the 2006
general law exempts the state from most of the law's
prohibitions, it specifically prohibits "the use, storage,
acquisition, and delivery by the state or public
administration" of anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions
and as of June 2009, depleted uranium munitions and armor.
The law also gives the Belgian state three years from June
20, 2007 to destroy its existing stock of depleted uranium
weapons and armor.

¶5. (C) The 2007 law deserves attention for two reasons.  One
potential concern is for transit and storage by the United
States and other NATO members of depleted uranium weapons on
and through Belgian territory.  The port of Antwerp has been
an important trans-shipment point for materiel for operations
Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and ISAF. The other is the
implications of the law for Belgium's position on depleted
uranium issues in international fora.  On the first point, we
have been assured by Werner Bauwens, Director of the
Non-Proliferation and Export Controls Office of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, that the law will not impact transit or
storage of such weapons by the United States and NATO.  He
states that as a civil law jurisdiction, Belgium's treaty
obligations to the United States and NATO take precedence
over its domestic law.  We also note that as a matter of
fact, similar Belgian laws prohibiting anti-personnel mines
and cluster munitions have not had an impact on U.S. or NATO
operations.

¶6. (C) Bauwens himself is not pleased by the law on depleted
uranium munitions, because he believes the scientific
evidence on depleted uranium is still not clear on the safety
of the material.  He said that later this year there will be
a discussion within the Belgian government about whether to
challenge the coming into force of the 2007 law.  Should the
law come into force, it will be difficult for the GOB to
continue to abstain on UNGA First Committee resolutions on
depleted uranium, such as the one that was the subject of
refs B and C.  Bauwens said that he came under significant
pressure from ecological groups at the time of this year's
first committee resolution, but resisted because the 2007 law
still had not come into force.  The Belgian law would provide
a focal point and argument for groups that oppose depleted
uranium munitions, and not only in Belgium.

¶7. (C) So far as we can tell, the law on depleted uranium
passed the Belgian House of Representatives unanimously in
2007, and reversing it may be difficult.  However, it may not
be impossible that an amendment further delaying the
implementation of the law might pass with strong enough
support from the government.  Meanwhile, post would
appreciate having a compendium of the research on the subject
that supports the U.S. position on depleted uranium for use
with Belgian officials and as appropriate, the media.  At the
same time, Bauwens has warned us that too much interference
in the legislative process by the United States would be
counterproductive, so any public diplomacy effort would have
to be thoroughly discussed and undertaken with a light touch.

¶8. (C) Action request: Post requests that the Department
consider the potential impact of the depleted uranium law on
transit and storage of DU materials by the U.S. and NATO, as
well as whether the law adversely impacts USG positions on DU
in international fora and in public opinion.  Post needs
information on the state of the scientific debate over DU as
well.  We stand ready to work with the Department to craft an
appropriate strategy on this issue.

BUSH

Israel admits firing depleted uranium in Gaza and...

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #190638  ? 
Subject Iaea/gaza/depleted Uranium: Israel Responds Negatively To Iaea Letter, Iaea Pledges To Stay Within Its Mandate
Origin UNVIE (United Nations)
Cable time Thu, 5 Feb 2009 16:03 UTC
Classification SECRET
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09UNVIEVIENNA50.html
History First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras ? Comments
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHUNV #0050/01 0361603
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051603Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8982
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0756
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1095
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0948
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0234
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1474
Hide header
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000050

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], PREL [External Political Relations], SENV [Environmental Affairs], IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], XF [Middle East], IS [Israel]
SUBJECT: IAEA/GAZA/DEPLETED URANIUM:  ISRAEL RESPONDS 
NEGATIVELY TO IAEA LETTER, IAEA PLEDGES TO STAY WITHIN ITS 
MANDATE 

REF: UNVIE 25

Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R Pyatt for reasons 1.4(c) and (e)

--------
Summary:
--------

¶1.  (C)  Following the IAEA's receipt of letters from the
Arab group and from the Palestinians calling for IAEA
assistance in the wake of alleged Israeli use of depleted
uranium munitions (DU) in Gaza (see reftel), the IAEA
Secretariat sent Israel a letter "inviting" Israel to submit
"any comments and/or information it may wish to share."
Israel responded negatively, charging that the Palestinian
request of the Agency "is not in line" with the IAEA's
mandate regarding DU-related activities.  The Secretariat has
assured Israel's Ambassador that the IAEA will stay within
its mandate, and in any case will not consider undertaking
any activities in Gaza until there is a "real" ceasefire
holding.  (Comment:  We have heard nothing more of any
possible effort to link the Gaza issue with Syria's claim
that uranium found at the Al-Kibar reactor site in Syria
originated from Israeli munitions.  Arab states, however,
will probably still try to infer a linkage during statements
at the March 2 IAEA Board of Governors meeting.  The
Secretariat appears to recognize the political landmines.
While their strategy may be to provide an opportunity for the
Arabs to vent on Gaza, such an opportunity risks setting in
motion a political escalation that could further complicate
our efforts in the coming months in the Board, as well as
perhaps in the September General Conference.)  End Summary
and Comment.

------------------------------
Israel Responds to IAEA Letter
------------------------------

¶2.  (C)  Further to reftel issue of an Arab/Palestinian
request for the IAEA to investigate the health/radiation
effects of the alleged Israeli use of DU munitions in Gaza,
the IAEA Secretariat sent Israel a letter dated January 23,
2009.  The letter from IAEA Office of External Relations and
Policy Coordination (EXPO) Director Vilmos Cserveny noted
receipt of reftel letters from Arab ambassadors in Vienna and
the Palestinian Observer at the IAEA, and "invited" Israel to
"submit any comments and/or information it may wish to share
in relation to the alleged use of depleted uranium."  (Full
text of IAEA letter at para. 6)

¶3.  (C)  On February 3, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli met with
Cserveny to deliver orally the Israeli response.  (Full text
of the Note Verbale from which Michaeli spoke, but that he
did not pass to Cserveny, is at para 7.  Please protect.)
The Israeli response stated that Israel has operated within
the realm of international law and that the Palestinian
request of the Agency "is not in line with" the Agency's
mandate.  It also notes IAEA findings elsewhere that
"practically negate" a link between DU and "significant
health or environmental impacts."  The Israelis also charged
that the Arab/Palestinian request was undermining the
professionalism of the Agency and was done for purposes of
providing a nuclear fig leaf under which the Arabs could make
political statements at the IAEA on the general issue of
Gaza.

¶4.  (C)  Michaeli told MsnOff that Cserveny listened
attentively to the Israeli response and responded with a
"loud and clear" promise that the IAEA would not go beyond
any legitimate mandate for the kind of health physics-related
survey the IAEA has supported in other locales.  Cserveny
also said that the IAEA would not in any case send any team
to Gaza until a "real" ceasefire is in place.  Should the
IAEA undertake any survey in Gaza, it would seek to do so in
partnership with either the World Health Organization (WHO)
or the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).  Michaeli 
noted to MsnOff that, should any survey/visit take place, 
Israel would prefer UNEP without the IAEA or WHO.  Israel's 
rationale was that UNEP alone made a similar inquiry in 
Lebanon and Israel believes acted professionally in that 
instance.  Michaeli suspects the Arabs approached the IAEA 
because they feel the DG may be more "compliant" than UNEP or 
WHO. 


-------
Comment
-------

¶5.  (S)  While the Secretariat's strategy may be to provide
an opportunity for the Arabs to vent on Gaza, such an
opportunity risks setting in motion a political escalation
that could further complicate our efforts in the coming
months in the Board, as well as perhaps in the September
General Conference.  Mission has heard no further indication
of any effort to link investigation of alleged Israeli-origin
DU in Gaza with Syrian allegations of Israeli-origin uranium
at Al-Kibar.  However, we strongly expect one or more Arab
states will at least imply a linkage in statements at the
March 2-5 IAEA Board of Governors meeting either under an
existing agenda item on the annual Safety Review or under AOB
.  To counter such rhetoric, Ambassador Schulte used a 
February 4 meeting of Vienna "like-minded"  Ambassadors (EU3, 
Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand) hosted by Australia on 
February 5 to alert counterparts to the likely Arab focus on 
the Gaza/DU issue and encourage a unified effort as necessary 
to prevent the success of any attempts to divert the Board 
meeting into such highly politicized terrain.   Ambassador 
Schulte counseled against elevating any DU debate in the 
Board,  but noted that an IAEA Legal opinion may be needed if 
the Arab Group steers the discussion in areas outside the 
Agency's mandate.  French Ambassador Deniau reported that the 
Quai D'Orsay Spokesman had already commented that any 
investigation of the use of DU in Gaza was outside the 
Agency's mandate.  France did not object to studying 
radiological effects of DU, but noted that the latest UNEP 
study in Lebanon in 2007 had reached the same conclusion on 
the negligible health impact as three previous ones in the 
Balkans and Kuwait cited by Ambassador Schulte.  Canada added 
that DU was not a banned munition.  However, given the public 
sensitivity of this issue and NGO perceptions, Germnay 
advised keeping the issue low key.  Ambassador Schulte 
agreed, so long as the Arab Group "stayed with in the lanes" 
of the IAEA's mandate. 

-----------------------------
Text of IAEA Letter to Israel
-----------------------------

¶6.  (C)  Begin Text:

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, on 21 January 2009, the
Director General received a communication from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the Agency in which he requested the
Director General to investigate reports of the use of
depleted uranium in Gaza.

The Director General had previously received on, 19 January
2009, a letter from the Resident Representative of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Vienna on behalf of the Council of
Ambassadors of Arab States Members of the Agency expressing
concern over the information available from various medical
and media sources on the possibility that depleted uranium
was used by Israel in Gaza and requesting the Director
General to undertake a physical and radiation evaluation.

In this connection, your Government is invited to submit any
comments and/or information it may wish to share in relation
to the alleged use of depleted uranium.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Vilmos Cserveny
Director, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination

---------------------------------------
Text of Israeli Response to IAEA Letter 
--------------------------------------- 

¶7.  (S)  Following points were delivered orally to IAEA 
Israeli Amb. Michaeli: 

NOTE VERBAL (3 February 2009) 

In response to your letter of 23 January 2009 and your 
invitation for Israel to submit any comments and/or 
information, the Government of Israel wishes to state the 


following: 

- The state of Israel has operated and is operating within 
the realm of the international law and the international 
conventions by which it is obliged.  This also covers the 
recent war in the Gaza area. 

- The GOI is confident that the IAEA Secretariat intends to 
work solely within the mandate of the Agency, and points out 
that the Palestinian request as delivered by the Secretariat 
to Israel is not in line with that mandate. 

- The GOI believes that the Arab states are aware of the 
empty nature of their complaints and requests, as there are 
no legal constraints on the use of depleted uranium and as 
several professional international organizations, including 
the IAEA, practically negate any between the use of that 
material and significant health or environmental impacts. 

- The GOI therefore believes that the Arab/Palestinian 
letters undermine the professional nature of the IAEA, as 
they are aimed at raising the Arab general view on the Gaza 
war in the frame of the Agency, and at involving the 
Secretariat in a political dispute over this war. 


SCHULTE