BELGIAN LAW LEAVES US&NATO UNAFFECTED

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #189253  ? 
Subject Belgian Law Banning Depleted Uranium To Take Effect In June 2009
Origin Embassy Brussels (Belgium)
Cable time Wed, 28 Jan 2009 16:59 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09BRUSSELS124.html
References 07BRUSSELS949, 08BRUSSELS1649
History First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras ? Comments
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000124

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, L, PM, EUR/RPM AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], MOPS [Military Operations], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], BE [Belgium]
SUBJECT: BELGIAN LAW BANNING DEPLETED URANIUM TO TAKE EFFECT IN JUNE 2009 

REF: A. 07 BRUSSELS 949
     B. STATE 107247
     C. STATE 111744
     D. BRUSSELS 1649

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Richard Eason, reason 1.4(b
) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request, see para 8.

¶2.  (C)  Summary: A law passed in 2007 banning depleted
uranium (DU) munitions and armor-plating will come into
effect in June 2009.  Post requests that the Department (PM,
IO, EUR, ISN, L and other interested bureaus) consider
whether the law could have an effect on transit or storage of
munitions or equipment with DU content by the U.S. or NATO in
Belgium. Post believes that in the future, the law could
influence Belgium's stance on depleted uranium in
multilateral fora and wider public opinion on the issue in
the world.  Post is ready to work with the Department to
craft a strategy to deal with the issue.  End Summary.

¶3. (C)  Belgium has been the center of a strong pacifist
movement since much of the country was devastated by World
War I.  One result of this social and political trend has
been a series of laws that have outlawed the production,
storage and transport of certain weapons, including poison
gas, antipersonnel mines, and cluster munitions.   The latest
in this series of laws is a law that prohibits inert
munitions and armor-plating that contain depleted uranium or
any other type of industrial uranium.  The law was passed in
May 2007 (ref A).  Because of concerns by the Belgian
government then in power about the uncertain state of the
scientific facts regarding the dangers associated with
depleted uranium, the law was written so as to come into
force two years from date of publication, in this case June
20, 2007.    As such, the law will come into effect on June
20, 2009 unless action to reverse is taken by the Belgian
government and Parliament.

¶4. (C) The 2007 law amends the general law on individual and
economic activities with arms (published June 9, 2006) to
state that depleted uranium weapons are prohibited along with
a list of other weapons.  While Article 27 of the 2006
general law exempts the state from most of the law's
prohibitions, it specifically prohibits "the use, storage,
acquisition, and delivery by the state or public
administration" of anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions
and as of June 2009, depleted uranium munitions and armor.
The law also gives the Belgian state three years from June
20, 2007 to destroy its existing stock of depleted uranium
weapons and armor.

¶5. (C) The 2007 law deserves attention for two reasons.  One
potential concern is for transit and storage by the United
States and other NATO members of depleted uranium weapons on
and through Belgian territory.  The port of Antwerp has been
an important trans-shipment point for materiel for operations
Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and ISAF. The other is the
implications of the law for Belgium's position on depleted
uranium issues in international fora.  On the first point, we
have been assured by Werner Bauwens, Director of the
Non-Proliferation and Export Controls Office of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, that the law will not impact transit or
storage of such weapons by the United States and NATO.  He
states that as a civil law jurisdiction, Belgium's treaty
obligations to the United States and NATO take precedence
over its domestic law.  We also note that as a matter of
fact, similar Belgian laws prohibiting anti-personnel mines
and cluster munitions have not had an impact on U.S. or NATO
operations.

¶6. (C) Bauwens himself is not pleased by the law on depleted
uranium munitions, because he believes the scientific
evidence on depleted uranium is still not clear on the safety
of the material.  He said that later this year there will be
a discussion within the Belgian government about whether to
challenge the coming into force of the 2007 law.  Should the
law come into force, it will be difficult for the GOB to
continue to abstain on UNGA First Committee resolutions on
depleted uranium, such as the one that was the subject of
refs B and C.  Bauwens said that he came under significant
pressure from ecological groups at the time of this year's
first committee resolution, but resisted because the 2007 law
still had not come into force.  The Belgian law would provide
a focal point and argument for groups that oppose depleted
uranium munitions, and not only in Belgium.

¶7. (C) So far as we can tell, the law on depleted uranium
passed the Belgian House of Representatives unanimously in
2007, and reversing it may be difficult.  However, it may not
be impossible that an amendment further delaying the
implementation of the law might pass with strong enough
support from the government.  Meanwhile, post would
appreciate having a compendium of the research on the subject
that supports the U.S. position on depleted uranium for use
with Belgian officials and as appropriate, the media.  At the
same time, Bauwens has warned us that too much interference
in the legislative process by the United States would be
counterproductive, so any public diplomacy effort would have
to be thoroughly discussed and undertaken with a light touch.

¶8. (C) Action request: Post requests that the Department
consider the potential impact of the depleted uranium law on
transit and storage of DU materials by the U.S. and NATO, as
well as whether the law adversely impacts USG positions on DU
in international fora and in public opinion.  Post needs
information on the state of the scientific debate over DU as
well.  We stand ready to work with the Department to craft an
appropriate strategy on this issue.

BUSH