DEPLETED URANIUM AND THE NAZI CONNECTION

DEPLETED URANIUM AND THE NAZI CONNECTION

http://www.angelfire.com/ca3/jphuck/BOOK3Ch12.html

Marco Saba of the Ethical Environmental Observatory traced the development of a uranium bomb by American scientists to World War II. He is a researcher who reported to the Italian Foreign Affairs Commission on January 18, 2000 on depleted uranium (DU). Saba pieced togther the following:

1945: Plans of DU kinetic penetrators passed by Nazi to U.S. at the very beginning of Operation Overcast with the deal of the submarine U-234 XB.

1966: First use to my (Saba's) knowledge in war of DU weapons (KKV-7 SMG Flechette), during Vietnam war.

1973: Israel use DU rounds (bought from South Africa) during Yom Kippur (FOIA released document by CIA).

1988: Accident in Germany: an aircraft A-10 fitted with DU rounds crash and burst in Remscheid, Germany. 24 houses set to fire, the following DU contamination has been keep secret by U.S. (Colonel Eric Daxon).

1988: Accident in Germany. 3 tanks M60 whith DU armor set to fire. The pieces recovered are returned in a C-5A military aircraft (who has, in turn, DU aileron counterweights ...). Waste disposed, buried, in the Nevada Atomic Testing Site. Contamination was covered up.

1991: DU rounds used in Iraq (akn. 340 Tonnes)

1993: DU rounds used in Somalia.

1994-1995: DU rounds used in Bosnia.

1996: Human Rights Watch release a FOIA about DU-ADAM "smart" land mines: 10 millions are stockpiled in U.S., few NATO countries bought those ADAM-mines (M692, M731): Greece, Netherlands but also Turkey, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

1998: DU missiles used in the SUDAN-Karthoum bombing (akn 3,7 tonnes).

1999: DU rounds used in Yugoslavia (akn 10,5 tonnes).

Saba's research indicated that the search for the uranium bomb by American scientists dated back to only six days after V-E Day. He explained that on May 14, 1945 a deal was forged between the United States and Germany. Martin Bormann, Hitler's Dolphin, and SS chief Heinrich Mueller were released by the Allies in exchange for a German U- 234 XB submarine which carried 560 kilograms of enriched uranium and a Messerschmidt 262 Schwalbe as well as scientists with secret plans for depleted uranium (DU) kinetic penetrators. "

Saba unraveled the series of events which led to the acquisition of uranium technology in the United States in 1945. "The most important and secret item of cargo, the uranium oxide, which I (Saba) believe was radioactive, was loaded into one of the vertical steel tubes (of German U-boat U-234). ... Two Japanese officers ... (were) ... painting a description in black characters on the brown paper wrapping. ... Once the inscription U235 had been painted on the wrapping of a package, it would then be carried over...and stowed in one of the six vertical mine shafts."

"Radio transmission of Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Chief Radio Operator of U-234: Lieut Comdr Karl B Reese USNR, Lieut (JG) Edward P McDermott USNR and Major John E Vance CE USA will report to commandant May 30th Wednesday in connection with cargo U-234."

According to "US Navy secret transmission #292045 from Commander Naval Operations to Portsmouth Naval Yard, 30 May 1945, ‘I just got a shipment in of captured material. ... I have just talked to Vance and they are taking it off the ship. ... I have about 80 cases of U powder in cases. He (Vance) is handling all of that now.' "

The "telephone transcript between Manhattan Project security officer Major Smith and Major Traynor, 14 June 1945" contained the following: "The traditional history of the atomic bomb accepts as an unimportant footnote the arrival of U-234 on United States shores, and admits the U-boat carried uranium oxide along with its load of powerful passengers and war-making materials. The accepted history also acknowledges these passengers were whisked away to Washington for interrogation and the cargo was quickly commandeered for use elsewhere. The traditional history even concedes that two Japanese officers were onboard U-234 and that they committed a form of unconventional Samurai suicide rather than be captured by their enemies. The traditional history denies, however, that the uranium on board U-234 was enriched and therefore easily usable in an atomic bomb. The accepted history asserts there is no evidence that the uranium cargo of U-234 was transferred into the Manhattan Project, although recent suggestions have hinted that this may have occurred. And the traditional history asserts that the bomb components on board U-234 arrived too late to be included in the atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan."

Saba's research showed that "the documentation indicates quite differently on all accounts. Before U-234 had landed at Portsmouth -- before it even left Europe - - United States and British intelligence knew U-234 was on a mission to Japan and that it carried important passengers and cargo. A portion of the cargo, especially, was of a singular nature. According to U-234s chief radio operator, Wolfgang Hirschfeld, who witnessed the loading of the U-boat: ‘The most important and secret item of cargo, the uranium oxide, which I (Hirschfeld) believe was highly radioactive, was loaded into one of the vertical steel tubes one morning in February, 1945. Two Japanese officers were to travel aboard U-234 on the voyage to Tokyo: Air Force Colonel Genzo Shosi, an aeronautical engineer, and Navy Captain Hideo Tomonaga, a submarine architect who, it will be recalled, had arrived in France aboard U-180 about eighteen months previously with a fortune in gold for the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I (Hirschfeld) saw these two officers seated on a crate on the forecasting engaged in painting a description in black characters on the brown paper wrapping gummed around each of a number of containers of uniform size. At the time I didn't see how many containers there were, but the Loading Manifest showed ten. Each case was a cube, possibly steel and lead, nine inches along each side and enormously heavy. Once the inscription U-235 had been painted on the wrapping of a package, it would then be carried over to the knot of crewmen under the supervision of Sub-Lt Pfaff and the boatswain, Peter Scholch, and stowed in one of the six vertical mineshafts.' "

Saba continued: "Hirschfeld's straightforward account of the uranium being "highly radioactive" -- he later witnessed the storage tubes being tested with Geiger counters -- and labeled "U-235" provides profoundly important information about this cargo. U- 235 is the scientific designation of enriched uranium — the type of uranium required to fuel an atomic bomb. While the uranium remained a secret from all but the highest levels within the United States until after the surrender of U-234, a captured German ULTRA encoder/decoder had allowed the Western Allies to intercept and decode German and Japanese radio transmissions. Some of these captured signals had already identified the U-boat as being on a special mission to Japan and even identified General Kessler and much of his cortege as likely to be onboard, but the curious uranium was never mentioned. The strictest secrecy was maintained, nonetheless, around the U-boat.

"As early as 13 May, the day before U-234 was actually boarded by the Sutton's prize crew, orders had already been dispatched that commanded special handling of the passengers and crew of U-234 when it was surrendered: Press representatives may be permitted to interview officers and men of German submarines that surrender. This message applies only to submarines that surrender. It does not apply to other prisoners of war. It does not apply to prisoners of the U-234. Prisoners of the U-234 must not be interviewed by press representatives."

"Two days later, while the Sutton was slowly steaming toward Portsmouth with U-234 at her side, more orders were received. ‘Documents and personnel of U- 234 are most important and any and all doubtful personnel should be sent here,' the commander of naval operations in Washington, D.C. ordered. The same day, the commander in chief of the Navy instructed, ‘Maintain prisoners U-234 incommunicado and send them under Navy department representative to Washington for interrogation.' "

"The effort to keep U-234 under wraps was only partially successful. Reporters had been allowed to interview prisoners from previous U-boats, and, in fact, were allowed to interview captured crews from succeeding U-boats, as well. When the press discovered U-234 was going to be off limits, a cry and hue went up that took two days to settle. Following extended negotiations, a compromise was struck between the Navy brass and the press core. The reporters were allowed to take photographs of the people disembarking the boat when it landed, but no talking to the prisoners was permitted. When they landed at the pier, the prisoners walked silently through the gawking crowd and climbed into buses, to be driven out of the spotlight and far from the glaring eyes of history. On 23 May, the cargo manifest of U-234 was translated by the office of Naval Intelligence, quickly triggering a series of events. On the second page of the manifest, halfway down the page, was the entry ‘10 cases, 560 kilograms, uranium oxide.' Whoever first read the entry and understood the frightening capabilities and potential purpose of uranium must have been stunned by the entry. Certainly questions were asked."

Saba asked, "Was this the first shipment of uranium to Japan or had others already slipped by? Did the Japanese have the capacity to use it? Could they build a bomb? Whatever the answers, within four days personnel from the Office of Naval Intelligence had brought U-234s second watch officer, Karl Pfaff -- who had not been brought to Washington with the original batch of high-level prisoners, but who had overseen loading of the U-boat in Germany -- to Washington and interrogated him. They quickly radioed Portsmouth: ‘Pfaff prepared manifest list and knows kind documents and cargo in each tube.' Pfaff states ‘… uranium oxide loaded in gold lined cylinders and as long as cylinders not opened can be handled like crude TNT. These containers should not be opened as substance will become sensitive and dangerous.' "

"The identification that the uranium was stowed in gold-lined cylinders and that it would become ‘sensitive and dangerous' when unpacked provides persuasive substantiation that this was U-235. Uranium that has had its proportion of the isotope U-235 increased compared to the more common isotope of uranium, U-238, is known as enriched uranium. When that enrichment becomes 70 percent or above, it is bomb-grade uranium. The process of enriching uranium during the war was highly technical and very expensive -- it still is. Upon first reading that the uranium on board U-234 was stored in gold-lined cylinders, this author (Saba) tracked down Clarence Larsen, former director of the leading uranium enrichment process at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the Manhattan Project's uranium enrichment facilities were housed. In a telephone conversation, I (Saba) asked Mr. Larsen what, if anything, would be the purpose of shipping uranium in gold-lined containers. Mr. Larsen remembered that the Oak Ridge program used gold trays when working with enriched uranium. He explained that, because uranium enrichment was a very costly process, enriched uranium needed to be protected jealously, but because it is very corrosive, it is easily invaded by any but the most stable materials, and would then become contaminated. To prevent the loss to contamination of the invaluable enriched uranium, gold was used. Gold is one of the most stable substances on earth. While expensive, Mr. Larsen explained, the cost of gold was a drop in the bucket compared to the value of enriched uranium. Would natural uranium, rather than enriched uranium, be stored in gold containers? I (Saba) asked. Not likely, Mr. Larsen responded. The value of natural uranium is, and was at the time, inconsequential compared to the cost of gold."

"Assuming the Germans invested roughly the same amount of money as the Manhattan Project to enrich their uranium, which it appears they did, the cost of the U-235 on board the submarine was somewhere in the neighborhood of $100,000 an ounce; by far the most expensive substance on earth. The fact that the enriched uranium had the capacity to deliver world dominance to the first country that processed and used it made it priceless. A long voyage with the U-235 stowed in anything but gold could have cost the German/Japanese atomic bomb program dearly in contaminated enriched uranium. In addition to the gold-lined shipping containers corroborating Hirschfeld's identification of the uranium as U-235, the description for handling the cargo and of the uranium's characteristics when its container was opened also tends to support the conclusion the uranium was enriched and not natural uranium. Uranium of all kinds is not only corrosive, but it is toxic if swallowed. In its natural state, however, which is 99.3 percent U-238, the substance poses little threat to man as long as he does not eat it. The stock of natural uranium that eventually was processed by the Manhattan Project originally had been stored in steel drums and was sitting in the open at a Staten Island storage facility. Much of the German natural uranium discovered in salt mines at the end of the war also was stored in steel drums, many of them broken open. The material was loaded into heavy paper sacks and carried from the storage area by apparently unprotected G.I.s. Since then, more precautions have been taken in handling natural uranium, but at the time, caution was minimal and natural uranium was considered to be relatively safe."

"For the Navy, therefore, to note the uranium would become ‘sensitive and dangerous' when the containers were opened, and should be ‘handled like crude TNT' when the containers were closed, indicates that the uranium was, in fact, enriched uranium. Uranium enriched significantly in U-235 is radioactive and is thus a health hazard, unlike natural uranium, and therefore should be handled with appropriate caution, as the communiqué described. One of the basic rules for handling packaged TNT is to ensure large quantities are not stored in close proximity to one another, when possible, in order to avoid accidental explosions becoming catastrophic. This aligns with one the basic rules of handling enriched uranium, which requires quantities approaching critical mass are not stored in close proximity, in order to avoid creating a chain reaction -- either causing irradiation or explosion. Other handling precautions for both substances have similar corollaries."

"By 16 June 1945, a second cargo manifest had been prepared for U- 234, this time by the United States Navy. But the uranium was not on the list. It was not even marked as shipped out or having once been on hand. It was never mentioned. It was gone -- as if it never existed. Where did the uranium go? Eleven days after U-234 was escorted into Portsmouth, and four days after Pfaff identified its location on the U-boat, a team was selected to oversee the offloading of U-234."

"Portsmouth received the following message: Lieut. Comdr. Karl B Reese USNR, Lieut (JG) Edward P McDermott USNR and Major John E Vance CE USA (Corps of Engineers, United States Army, the Manhattan Project's parent organization) will report to commandant May 30th Wednesday in connection with cargo U-234."

"It is contemplated that shipment will be made by ship to ordnance investigation laboratory NAVPOWFAC Indian Head Maryland if this is feasible. The order, dispatched by the chief of naval operations, is revealing if not outright startling for the selection of one member of its three-man team. Including Major Vance of the Army Corps of Engineers in what was otherwise an all Navy operation seems a telling selection. The military services of the United States, as in most other countries, were highly competitive with one another. True, U- 234's cargo included a mixed bag of aeronautics, rocketry and armor-piercing technology that the Army could use, too, but the Navy had programs for all of these materials and surely would have done its own analysis first and then possibly shared the information with its service brothers. Someone, somewhere at a very high level, appears to have seen that the Army was brought into the scavenging operation that had become U-234; not just any Army group, but the group that oversaw the Manhattan Project-- the Corps of Engineers."

"Major John E. Vance was not only from the Corps of Engineers, the Army department under which the Manhattan Project operated, but, if a telephone transcript taken from Manhattan Project archives refers to the same ‘Vance' as the Major assigned to offload U-234 -- as it appears to -- then he was part of America's super-secret atomic bomb project, as well. The transcript is of a conversation between Manhattan Project intelligence officers Smith and Traynor and was recorded two weeks after ‘Major Vance' was assigned to the team responsible for unloading the material captured on U-234."

"Smith: ‘I just got a shipment in of captured material and there were 39 drums and 70 wooden barrels and all of that is liquid. What I need is a test to see what the concentration is and a set of recommendations as to disposal. I have just talked to Vance and they are taking it off the ship and putting it in the 73rd Street Warehouse. In addition to that I have about 80 cases of U powder in cases. He (Vance) is handling all of that now. Can you do the testing and how quickly can it be done? All we know is that it ranges from 10 to 85 percent and we want to know which and what. Traynor: Can you give me what was in those cases?"

"Smith: ‘U powder. Vance will take care of the testing of that."

"Traynor: ‘The other stuff is something else?' "

"Smith: ‘The other is water.' "

"U-234s cargo manifest reveals that, besides its uranium, among its cargo was 10 ‘bales' of drums and 50 ‘bales' of barrels. The barrels are noted in the manifest to have contained benzyl cellulose, a very stable substance that may have been used as a biological shield from radiation or as a coolant or moderator in a liquid reactor. The manifest lists the drums as containing ‘confidential material.' As surprising as it may seem, this secret substance may have been the ‘water' that Major Smith noted in his discussion with Major Traynor. Why would water be described as ‘confidential material'? Why would Major Smith want the water tested? And what did he mean when he said that its concentration ranged ‘from 10 to 85 percent and we want to know which and what' "?

"The leaders of the German project to breed plutonium had decided to use heavy water, or deuterium oxide, as the moderator for a plutonium-breeding liquid reactor. The procedure of creating heavy water results in regular water molecules picking up an additional hydrogen atom. The percentage of water molecules with the extra hydrogen represents the level of concentration of the heavy water. Thus Major Smith's seemingly overzealous concern about water and his question about concentration is predictable if Smith suspected the material was intended for a nuclear reactor. And using heavy water as a major element of their plutonium breeding reactor project, it is easy to see why the Germans labeled the drums ‘confidential material.' The evidence indicates that U-234 -- if the captured cargo being tested by ‘Vance' was from U-234, which seems very probable given all considerations -- carried components for making not only a uranium bomb, but a plutonium bomb, also."

"Further corroborating the connection of the barrels and drums as those that were taken from U-234 is a handwritten note found in the Southeast national archives held at East Point, Georgia. Dated 16 June, 1945, two days after Smith's and Traynor's telephone conversation, the note described how 109 barrels and drums -- the exact total given in the Smith/Traynor transcript -- were to be tested with geiger counters to determine if they were radioactive. The note also included instructions that an ‘intelligence agent cross out any markings on drums and bbls. and number them serially from 1 to 109 and make note of what was crossed out.' The note goes on to say that this recommendation was given to and approved by Lt. Colonel Parsons, General Groves' right-hand man on the military side of the Manhattan Project. And lastly, the writer of the note had called Major Smith, apparently to report back to him, leading one to believe the note's author may have been Major Traynor."

"Was the captured cargo discussed by Smith and Traynor from U-234? The presence of a Mr. ‘Vance' who was in charge of ‘U powder,' almost certainly proves so. The documents under consideration and the conversation they detail are from Manhattan Project files and are about men who worked for the Manhattan Project. Using the letter ‘U' as an abbreviation for uranium was widespread throughout the Manhattan Project. That there could have been another ‘Vance' who was working with uranium powder -- especially "captured" uranium powder -- seems unlikely. And the fact that the contents of the barrels listed on the U- boat manifest were identified as containing a substance likely to be used in a nuclear reactor, benzyl cellulose, and that the barrels in the Smith/Traynor transcript and the untitled note -- as well as the drums -- were tested for radioactivity by geiger counter, certainly links the ‘captured' materials to no other source than U-234."

"Besides linking the ‘captured' uranium on board U-234 to the Manhattan Project through Major Vance, another striking and important detail is revealed in this telephone transcript. The uranium is spoken of as being in ‘about 80 cases.' Assuming these are the same containers the uranium was shipped in, and there is good reason to believe so, those cases may have been the same gold-lined cylinders referred to in Navy secret cable #262151, referred to earlier. To have distributed up 560 kilograms of natural uranium into 80 smaller cases -- whether as stowed on U-234 by the Germans or after offloading by the Americans -- does not make sound economic sense, either in terms of monetary cost or in terms of space, which was at a desperately high premium inside U-234. The logical option would have been to transport the uranium in as large a quantity as reasonable for lifting and stowage, saving space and cost. To have divided 560 kilograms into 80 cases means each case weighed about seven kilograms (15.5 lbs.), considerably smaller than one would think was either efficient or least expensive. But if the uranium was enriched, there would be a requirement to separate the powder into sub-critical quantities to avoid creating a critical mass -- and the devastating nuclear chain reaction that would follow. Critical Mass was 15 kilograms. Stowing half of critical mass in each container, about seven kilograms -- the amount of 560 kilograms divided into 80 cases -- would be a safe, and logical, quantity. But in the U-boat, the containers of enriched uranium still would be packed in close proximity to one another; still supporting a critical scenario.

The solution: make the containers cylindrical so when tightly packed the walls don't touch on all edges, thus breaking up the critical mass. Lining the walls of the cylinders with gold, a dense, neutron reflecting element that Manhattan Project scientists had once considered using as a neutron reflecting tamper in the plutonium bomb , would provide an extra level of protection above and beyond deterring contamination. The dense gold would suppress neutrons from migrating through the container walls, further curbing a chain reaction. This would be especially beneficial protection in the U-boat, where direct exposure to salt water would provide a reactor moderator -- the perfect environment for creating a chain reaction."

"The new-found evidence taken en mass demonstrates that, despite the traditional history, the uranium captured from U-234 was enriched uranium that was commandeered into the Manhattan Project more than a month before the final uranium slugs were assembled for the uranium bomb. The Oak Ridge records of its chief uranium enrichment effort -- the magnetic isotope separators known as calutrons -- show that a week after Smith's and Traynor's 14 June conversation, the enriched uranium output at Oak Ridge nearly doubled -- after six months of steady output. Edward Hammel, a metallurgist who worked at the Chicago Met Lab, where the enriched uranium was fabricated into the bomb slugs, corroborated this report of late-arriving enriched uranium. Mr. Hammel told the author (Saba) that very little enriched uranium was received at the laboratory until just two or three weeks -- certainly less than a month -- before the bomb was dropped. The Manhattan Project had been in desperate need of enriched uranium to fuel its lingering uranium bomb program. The cumulative evidence seems very persuasive that U-234 provided the enriched uranium needed, as well as components for a plutonium breeder reactor."

"From the transcript of an introduction to a lecture given by Dr Heinz Schlicke to the Navy Department: ‘Mr. Alvarez' appears to be Dr. Schlicke's handler. Manhattan Project physicist Luis Alvarez was credited with at the last minute solving th plutonium bomb's fuse problems. Uranium does not appear to be the only component aboard U-234 capable of being used to make an atomic bomb. There were the steel drums and wooden barrels full of fluids (mentioned earlier) which Manhattan Project personnel tested, apparently to see if the materials had been, or could be, part of a plutonium breeder reactor. And there were tons of lead, possibly for radiation protection; mercury, possibly for very fast mercury switches; and infra-red proximity fuses. The infrared fuses were discovered within five days of U-234s landing at Portsmouth, apparently as the result of Dr. Heinz Schlicke's interrogation. A memorandum written by Jack H. Alberti dated 24 May 1945 stated, ‘Dr. Schlicke knows about the infrared proximity fuses which are contained in some of these packages. ... Dr. Schlicke knows how to handle them and is willing to do so.' "

Schlicke and two others were flown to Portsmouth to retrieve the infrared proximity fuses. "... Beyond fusing and explosives expertise, he (Schlike) was either referenced by other prisoners of U-234, listed in documents onboard U-234, or admitted to being knowledgeable in or responsible for: very high technology radar and radio systems, guided missile development, and V2 rockets. While still in Germany, he also had met with a long list of scientists. ... That Schlicke was personally and almost immediately flown back to U-234 specifically to retrieve the infrared fuses, from among all the technology for which he was responsible, seems very revealing. It suggests that the infrared fuses were of immediate interest to the United States, not just as the booty of war, as were all the other technologies on the boat, but expediting retrieval of the fuses seems to have been driven by a need to have them immediately available for some purpose."

"... For a year-and-a-half, the Los Alamos scientists tried to develop a simultaneously firing detonation system. ... Indeed, into late June and early July, just two weeks before the first atomic bomb test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, the detonator timing problem was still not resolved. The experts at Los Alamos had been working on the timing problem since the fall of 1943, but had failed to solve it when, in October 1944, Robert Oppenheimer created a committee to tackle the detonator problem. The first name on the three-man team was Luis Alvarez. ... Alvarez also became one of the great heroes of the atomic bomb story when he solved the plutonium bomb detonator timing problem in the last days before the Trinity Test. ... Of all the Manhattan Project personnel whose name one would expect to see connected to Heinz Schlicke's and U-234's infrared proximity fuses, if there was a connection, Luiz Alvarez's name would be at the top of that list. ..."

"... By late spring 1945, when U-234 arrived on American shores with just two months left until the Trinity Test -- the first test of an atomic bomb -- the detonator problem was still unsolved and its resolution was now paramount to the success of the entire program. Alvarez, as the key man assigned to the problem, was in desperate need of a fusing system that could fire multiple detonators simultaneously. Schlicke had fuses that worked on the principles that govern light -- presumably they worked at the speed of light."

"In fact, among the documents Schlicke was accompanying to Japan was a report on ‘the investigation of the usability of ultraviolet (invisible) light for transmitting messages or commands and particularly for the remote ignition of warhead fuses.' The report had been prepared based on research done from 1939 through 1941 by Hans Klumb and Bernard Koch. In suggesting that ‘the ultraviolet method permits the transmission of much more concentrated energy compared with the infra-red method,' the inference is made that infrared was also usable for similar purposes, though lower concentrations of energy made it problematic. Ultraviolet light, on the other hand, according to the same report, appears to have presented its own challenges to the task because it had a ‘stronger absorption rate.' "

"... But what about the identification of Alvarez as a Commander in the Navy? General Groves supplied military identities -- uniforms, ranks and papers -- to scientists Robert Furman and James Nolan, so they could escort the enriched uranium bomb cores to Tinian on board the USS Indianapolis without raising suspicion."

"... According to Harlow Russ, who wrote in his book Project Alberta about his work on the team that assembled the plutonium bomb, two significant changes were made to the bomb design at the last minute. One was the development and inclusion in the plutonium bomb of ‘detonator chimneys' that were developed so late in the process that they were not included in the first four shipments of equipment to Tinian, the Pacific airfield from which the bombs were dropped on Japan. The second design addition was a series of small-diameter stainless steel tubes that ‘vented' radiation from the plutonium core, according to Russ's explanation, to allow the technicians to monitor activity at the core. Russ makes a point of stating both additions were new and just in time for the Trinity Test. These modifications suggest that very late before the plutonium bomb's use, passages were being built into the bomb that, presumably, would allow the free flow of radiation, or light waves, throughout the device. Theoretically, with these passages in place, once any one of the 64 detonators was ignited, the system allowed emitted infrared waves to travel at the speed of light through the ‘detonator chimneys' to the other detonators/fuses and simultaneously ignite all the fuses at the speed of light. As a back-up plan, once any one of the firing detonators compressed the plutonium core at the center enough to achieve even a partial chain reaction, the radiation from that event would be emitted out to the detonators, again at the speed of light, and, again, simultaneously fire all of the detonators."

"Given the timing of the developments, from Alvarez's arrival on the U- 234 scene, to Schlicke's special trip to retrieve the fuses, to Alvarez's solving the timing problem so late in the process, and Russ receiving last-minute design changes apparently initiated to provide paths for the free movement of light waves within the bomb, such a scenario certainly seems viable. In an effort to substantiate or eliminate this theory, I (Saba) tried to call Harlow Russ on the telephone at his home in Los Alamos to ask him about the detonator chimneys, venting tubes, and if, in general, there were any significant changes to the actual detonators themselves. Unfortunately my (Saba's) call came too late; I (Saba) was informed Mr. Russ had died in the few months between when I (Saba) received from him his book and when I (Saba) had developed the above scenario."

"The second factor suggesting the detonators used to fire the plutonium bomb came from Dr. Schlicke is the striking success of the Trinity Test of the plutonium bomb. Trinity was ‘successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone,' wrote General Groves. ‘Nearly everyone was surprised,' Robert Serber recorded. In his quintessential theme on the subject, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Richard Rhodes wrote that Trinity was four times its expected yield. What could have caused such a remarkable miscalculation by the experts?"

"Those who knew the problems the system was experiencing in firing all of the detonators at once by mechanical means, but were unaware that the proximity fuses were being utilized to make detonation occur at the speed of light, certainly would not have expected the profoundly superior results. Thinking the detonation was still limited by hard-cable restrictions and physical switches, and based on tests of these systems, the scientists were expecting a much less dramatic event. Instead, they were surprised by the power and efficiency of the explosion. That so many who knew what the outcome of the detonation should have been were so surprised by how efficient it actually was, tends to indicate that Schlicke's infra-red proximity fuses were used to compress the plutonium core at the speed of light."